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The tensions between religion and politics in the United States have been part of 
this country’s national identity from the beginning. The framers of the Constitution, 
while trying to accommodate the religious fervor of Puritan culture, at the same 
time did not wish to relinquish their Enlightenment beliefs in the rational basis of 
self-governance, so they walked a conceptual tightrope in trying to satisfy both 
the Thomas Paines and the Cotton Mathers of early American culture. The irony 
is that while this separation of Church and State was upheld precisely to prevent 
the rampant religious warfare so recently scourging Europe, the tensions between 
secularists and religious peoples remained in the United States long after it waned 
on the Continent. The tensions are, in fact, very much with us today. 
But even though these tensions remain, the precise alignments of religion and 
politics in the course of United States history have ﬂuctuated. While in large part 
upholding the values of Puritanism, religion in American history has also at times 
taken the side of progressive thought, especially in the mid-twentieth century, when 
the interplay between Liberation Theology and the Civil Rights Movement deﬁned 
“traditional values” not in terms of sexual repression and nationalism, but rather 
as a duty to the poor, the oppressed, and the powerless. 
The origins of what has come to be called Liberation Theology began in the 
1950s and 1960s, as a reaction against somewhat earlier populist, but repressive, 
regimes that were more or less the norm in the southern Americas, such as the 
Brazilian dictatorship of Getúlio Dornelles Vargas1 or the government of Mexican 
populist leader Lázaro Cárdenas.2 Perhaps the most well-known and typical example 
of this type of regime appeared in Argentina, in the form of the Perón government, 
which consolidated power and economic inﬂuence through similar populist and 
nationalist political policy. These regimes, while in various ways promising to 
raise the living standards of the poor by taxing the rich, often ended up doing 
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neither. Overall, Perónism beneﬁted neither the rich nor the poor, but rather its own 
power base—the middle and upper classes—which threw increasing numbers of 
peasants into deepening poverty, while returning much of the tax revenue collected 
from the rich back to the rich. The growing marginalization of huge sectors of the 
populations in these countries, a marginalization that ideologies like Perónism were 
supposed to stop, led to the rise of popular resistance movements, which were, in 
turn, crushed by the rise of military dictatorships throughout the region. Against 
this background of struggle and (usually) defeat, the Cuban revolution became 
the iconic victory of the poor against the power of Capital, and the revolutionary 
spirit of the age was born.3 
At roughly the same time that these economic and political struggles were 
being solidiﬁed in developing countries, the Christian churches in Europe, and then 
America—exempliﬁed by the extraordinarily social and political proclamations 
crystallized in a somewhat later Vatican II—were undergoing political realignments 
of their own. In Europe, the philosopher and Catholic convert Jacques Maritain, 
the Jesuit paleontologist Teilhard de Chardin, and the philosopher-theologian Yves 
Congar, whose works inspired and even provoked the social, political, and moral 
vision of Vatican II, emerged as principal inﬂuences in the evolution of modern 
social thought within Christian traditions. Similarly, in the United States, the 
protestant theologians Paul Tillich (in his later work) and his colleague Reinhold 
Niebuhr applied enlightened Christian thinking to the social and political issues 
of the day, while numerous others were trying to refocus the aims of traditional 
Christianity toward more worldly goals—ﬁghting poverty and calling attention to 
oppression and the violation of human rights. At the same time, ﬁgures like reformer 
and Catholic relief-worker Dorothy Day, and somewhat later, the contemplative 
Trappist monk Thomas Merton4 were working to reform their own traditions 
along deeply humanist and spiritual lines. The socio-economic struggles in South 
America and the rise of numerous socially conscious Christian groups, inspired by 
the succession of Christian thinker and reformers, laid the groundwork for what 
became, in the 1960s, Liberation Theology—a theology whose interests were 
increasingly more aligned with the welfare of the poor in this world than with the 
concerns of the soul in the world to come.
While all this was happening within the more mainstream Christian 
denominations, something even more remarkable was happening in more 
marginalized churches in the United States:  the birth of the Civil Rights Movement, 
grounded in the Black Baptist communities that organized themselves over the 
course of a decade, eventually converging in Selma, Alabama, in 1965, in one of 
the most agonizing and exhilarating struggles for political, social, and spiritual 
liberation in the contemporary age.5 This Movement, which became the model for 
nearly all subsequent liberation movements in the United States, was born of the 
work of the NAACP and crystallized through the genius of Martin Luther King 
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and the Southern Christian Leadership Council of the 1950s and 1960s. From the 
heroic struggles and martyrdom of those in the Civil Rights movement—like those 
sacriﬁced in Liberation movements throughout the Third World6—to the anti-war 
work of Christian and Jewish ecumenical groups like Clergy and Laity Concerned, 
again and again the front-line shock troops of the progressive political struggles of 
mid-twentieth century and beyond have come from the ranks of men and women 
of faith, of soul. Where, then, has faith gone in the progressive politics of today? 
Where has the soul retreated to within the realms of academic political thought? 
Why is the subject of spirituality met with almost universal disdain among those 
whose current political visions were born in the churches and synagogues, temples 
and mosques of the 1950s and 1960s? On the surface, at least, the soul-death of 
these movements came in large part from two distinct sources:  the ﬁrst was the 
U.S intelligence community, speciﬁcally the FBI’s COINTELPRO program, which 
targeted political and religious groups that were opposed to United States policy 
in the Third World, and the second was the militant anti-Marxist papacy of John-
Paul II, who, in forbidding the political grass-roots struggles against poverty in 
South America and the United States, ceded control of “political Christianity” to 
the religious right. 
The “neutralization” (J. Edgar Hoover’s word) of political/religious movements 
by COINTELPRO (the cold war’s version of the Patriot Act) begun in the 1950s 
and intensifying in the 1960s, ended, ﬁnally, in 1971 with the publication of the so-
called Church Report, but not before destroying unnumbered political movements 
and individuals by threat, coercion, and admitted lies effected through the use of 
illegal wiretaps, unauthorized searches and seizures, disinformation campaigns, 
and possibly even political assassinations. According to the ﬁndings of the Church 
Commission, assembled to investigate the excesses of COINTELPRO during this 
period, the FBI, while claiming “to protect the national security and to prevent 
violence,” targeted citizens who “were concededly nonviolent, were not controlled 
by a foreign power, and posed no threat to the national security.”7 Moreover, the 
FBI routinely engaged in activities that preempted the First Amendment rights of 
United States citizens, including the right to free speech, and the right to assemble 
peaceably. The results of these actions were widespread and devastating, and deserve 
a direct quote from the Church Commission’s ﬁndings:  
The tactics used against Americans often risked and sometimes 
caused serious emotional, economic, or physical damage. Actions 
were taken which were designed to break up marriages, terminate 
funding or employment, and encourage gang warfare between 
violent rival groups. Due process of law forbids the use of such 
covert tactics, whether the victims are innocent law-abiding 
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citizens or members of groups suspected of involvement in 
violence.8 
Finally, and perhaps most egregiously, the FBI targeted Martin Luther King in order 
to “destroy” him, a tactic, the Commission acknowledged, that “violated the law and 
fundamental human decency.” Arguably, the single difference between the excesses 
of Hoover’s COINTELPRO and the excesses of the current Patriot Act is that 
John Ashcroft’s bill legitimizes what the Church Committee saw as fundamentally 
unconstitutional and immoral—a lethal difference, I would suggest, that speaks 
more to soul than it does to intellect, more to fundamental decency than to theory. 
In destroying the religious, political movements of the 1960s and 1970s, Hoover 
instituted his own brand of soul-death, and to the degree that we, as theorists, share 
in it through our unconsidered dismissal of the religious thought of earlier leftist 
intellectuals, he and the American intelligence community have won. 
 Seven years after the demise of COINTELPRO, Cardinal Karol Wojtyla 
was elevated to the papacy as John Paul II, driving the ﬁnal nails into the cofﬁn of 
Liberation Theology movements everywhere. Although not nearly as vicious, and 
rising nowhere near the level of Hoover’s tactics, the anti-Marxist proclamations of 
John Paul II, arrived at through the counsel of his papal successor, Joseph Ratzinger, 
had a no less chilling effect on “political” Catholicisms—both the Liberation 
Theology movements, as well as the day-to-day community work of Catholic Relief 
agencies worldwide. The irony, of course, is that while Karol Wojtyla—as priest, 
bishop, cardinal, and ﬁnally pope—was deeply involved in the anti-communist, 
anti-Semitic, anti-totalitarian movements in Poland from his ordination in the 
1940s through to the fall of communism in the 1980s—even giving succor to the 
anti-communist Solidarity movement in Poland after he became pope9—he failed 
to see that the evil that Eastern European Stalinism represented was also present 
in totalitarian movements in other countries. His own political activism seems to 
have blinded him to the larger goals of political resistance.
By now, however, many of the church-born leftist movements of the 1960s 
had already infected the European intelligentsia and youth culture with its antiwar 
and antiracism zeal. The American politics of the 1960s and 1970s, which had been 
inﬂuenced earlier by European philosophers and theologians (the earlier mentioned 
Maritain, Chardin, and Congar, but also Juergen Moltmann, Johannes Baptist Metz, 
and Dietrich Bonhoeffer), in turn inﬂuenced a number of major French intellectuals 
such as Gilles Deleuze, Jean Baudrillard, and, to a lesser extent, Michel Foucault, 
during the Paris upheavals of May 1968, which encouraged the cross-pollination 
of ideas between an emergent structuralism/post-structuralism and the intense 
political/social consciousness brought about, in part, by rage at political and 
economic oppression epitomized by the United States’s involvement in Viet Nam 
and all of the economic and social evil that that war has come to represent. Thus, 
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when post-structural theories eventually “returned” to the American academy, they 
had been pretty thoroughly “materialized” in a Marxist sense and were, as the result 
of a by now thoroughly secular European Marxism, stripped of the very spiritual 
impulses that gave nurturance to the protest culture of the 1950s and 1960s.
But the “return” of theory in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s 
brought with it its own ironies:  newly acquired Marxist materialisms trying to 
situate themselves in a historically non-Marxist American culture, a culture that has 
traditionally eschewed the very notion of class conﬂict. As a result, the attacks on 
Capitalist ideology by Marxian ideologues often did more to distance theoreticians 
from mainstream culture than to allow them to critique it in ways that might 
actually inﬂuence or change it. The growing insularity of academic enclaves from 
“mainstream” American cultures changed its relations to the political in fundamental 
ways, no longer championing the rights of the downtrodden, but now cordoning off 
intellectual and political turf within the academy:  who is the edgiest, the hippest, 
or more recently, who is the most historical, the most radical in the worst sense, 
losing sight of the broader happenings within an American political culture that was 
and is becoming more and more inﬂuenced by reactionary thinking. In this process 
we ourselves—that is, political and critical theorists within the academy—became, 
among others, objects of resistance by an increasingly right-wing administration, 
in part because as a community we, in many cases, ceased thinking and working 
toward the common good (the “progressive” vision of the democratic ideal), while 
encouraging the processes of intellectual and theoretical balkanization—staking 
out claims, working to establish political identities for increasingly subdivided 
communities. And while this process was and is both understandable, and perhaps 
necessary, it has often blinded us to the larger issues of community and sacriﬁce, 
issues that, in the milieu of 1960s spirituality, were correctives to this process of 
“turning inward” in a kind of oxymoronic political solipsism, losing sight of the 
real goal of political action—what is important is not “my” liberation, or even the 
liberation of “my” community, but the liberation of whole peoples through sacriﬁce 
and the building of communities across differences, in spite of difference. 
The ﬁnal irony is that while “theory” has become thoroughly secularized in its 
passage through European structuralism and Marxism, in France, Italy, and Canada, 
the issue of religion and spirituality has been ascendant—inﬂuenced, perhaps, by 
the late work of Jacques Lacan from the 1950s, Emmanuel Levinas’s work from 
the 1960s, and Jean-Paul Sartre’s from the 1980s. More recently, Jacques Derrida 
and Jean-François Lyotard in France, Gianni Vattimo in Italy, and Harold Coward 
and David Loy in Canada,10 have begun, in very different ways, to resituate the 
discussions of religion and spirituality in their own analyses of the Real and its 
relation to the political and social, to identity, and to identity politics. The thrust 
in many of these more recent writers centers on what Lacan might call the lack, 
or what I might call bereavement—an emptiness that, in this paper, represents 
90                                                              Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism
the very loss of the spiritual, of soul, in much current theory, a loss that reﬂects, 
in a fundamental sense, the very source of spirituality itself:  born of the lack 
that is doubt, inadequacy, grief, and loss, the ego supplies that which is missing 
as certainty, belief, ideology, repetition. While it may be easy for us to see how 
this works in a facile way for right-wing religious groups, we refuse to see this 
same lack operating in progressive politics, the praxis that ﬁlls the space of doubt 
with either the (let’s face it) seeming certainties of political analyses or, in the 
ﬁnal movement, with the uncertainties themselves—the endless play of critique, 
différance, and contingency.11 This certainty-in-uncertainty is what conservative 
politics, in its most discerning moments, sees in us—we are no different in our 
certainties from “true believers,” but we see our analytic moves as “authentic” and 
theirs as ﬁgments of imagination (which may very well be true). But this progressive 
gambit in turn conceals the very lack that calls into play the Marxist “materialist” 
stance, a materialist lack that is increasingly embattled on all sides—from religion 
on the right, to science on the left.12
Unfortunately, the “retooling” of spiritual liberation discourses of the 1960s 
toward the secularization of social action has led inevitably to contradictory 
impulses—while we may abhor the desecularizing agendas of the religious right, 
we no longer have the perceived moral authority to speak as progressive and 
engaged thinkers.13 The right has usurped the moral high ground that gave birth to 
much of American leftist politics in mid-century. The right now wields scripture 
like an AK-47, while we elaborate on theory, and, as the etymological histories of 
these two terms—scripture and theory—would suggest, scripture trumps theory 
every time. 
In the simplistic mindset of American popular culture, simple truths are 
the preferred truths. Complexity breeds disdain. We need, it seems to me, to 
question the more banal superﬁcialities of postmodern culture, the New Ageism 
of multivalent and multifarious spiritual “traditions,” many of them bogus, that 
serve in the end the interests of Wall Street—more book sales, music sales, etc. 
We might perhaps instead embrace intellectually, if not personally, the traditions 
from which we have emerged:  we should perhaps re-read religious scripture with, 
in the words of liberation theology, “a bias toward the poor” and oppressed. Or 
perhaps we should understand not so much the political impulses of the gospels 
that “traditional” liberation theologies jumped at, but rather the predisposition of 
the gospels toward women, the poor, the oppressed:  this is certainly not a new 
idea—what is new, however, is also to see religious texts like the gospel parables 
as what my colleague Bryan Reynolds would call “transversal” discourses:  the 
use of parable, for example, as moral examples that resist easy interpretation—that 
are, after all “parabolic.”14 We should also reconsider the incomprehensibility 
and immorality of violent death in the cruciﬁxion over and against the death-cult 
iconization of torture in movies like The Passion of the Christ, whose images 
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stand in discomﬁting juxtaposition to images from Abu Ghraib (the prisoner, in 
black KKK-type hood, yet with arms outstretched in cruciﬁxion pose). We might 
consider exchanging the cults-of-death instead with the overwhelming and abiding 
humanity of the person of Jesus. Reading and understanding these texts from a moral 
and ethical standpoint—even if that standpoint is purely secular—may provide a 
much weightier challenge to the powers of right wing, neo-conservative religious 
movements than the current anti-religious political discourses of the academic left. 
For one thing seems certain to me at this point in history:  the left’s continuing 
negative critique of religion has done more to disempower the left than it has to 
diminish the power of the right.
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